*August 6, 2013*

Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546

Dear Mr. Bolden:

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has reviewed the ten open NASA responses to their recommendations. Of these ten recommendations, the ASAP has determined that recommendation 2011-01-03b can be closed. Enclosure 1 provides a summary of the nine remaining open recommendations.

Sincerely,

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.)
Chair

Enclosure

Rec. No.	Title	ASAP Status	ASAP Evaluation of To-Date Responses
2011-01-02	**Safety and Mission Assurance Role Descriptions:** NASA should begin to draft a role description as well as some key job requirements, such as educational background and experience., for the personnel who have to specify, manage, and assure the S&MA activities under the new program direction. NASA needs to articulate the skills needed as soon as possible.	Open, pending understanding of policy recommendations to NPR 7120.8 made in the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance's Research and Technology Strategy (ORTS) Team Study	
2011-04-01	**Chief Knowledge Officer Positions:** To ensure the identification and capture of critical NASA implicit and explicit knowledge, the ASAP recommends NASA establish a single focal point (a Chief Knowledge Officer) within the Agency to develop the policy and requirements necessary to integrate knowledge capture across programs, projects, and Centers. Additionally, the ASAP recommends that NASA consider establishing Chief Knowledge Officer positions at all NASA Centers and in all Mission Directorates to ensure standardization of programs and lessons-learned as we move forward.	Open with monitoring for receipt of revised NPR 7120.6 expected release in Oct 2013.	
2012-01-02	**ISS Deorbit Capability:** (1) To assess the urgency of this issue, NASA should develop an estimate of the risk to ground personnel in the event of uncontrolled ISS reentry. (2) NASA should then develop a timeline for development of a controlled reentry capability that can safely deorbit the ISS in the event of foreseeable anomalies.	Open waiting implementation timeline and the final plan.	
2012-03-01	**Software Assurance and CMMI Requirements:** All NASA internal safety-critical software development groups should achieve CMMI Level 3 (or an equivalent as established by external validation agent) by the end of FY 14.	Open. The ASAP is concern about the schedule slip of CCMI ML 3 at KSC. Request rationale of delay, anticipated schedule and briefing next time the panel is at KSC.	
2012-03-02	**Software Assurance Metrics:** NASA should provide metrics and trends that demonstrate whether the software assurance provisions are working and provide return on investment.	Open pending receipt of sample metrics and data trends.	

Rec. No.	Title	ASAP Status	ASAP Evaluation of To-Date Responses
2012-03-03	**Software Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Requirements:** NASA should establish a standard identifying the level of criticality that requires software IV&V, i.e., at what risk level must IV&V be required and therefore either be resourced, or if that is not possible, a formal waiver process be in place for an accountable individual to accept the associated risk and document it.	Open. Great process, look forward to seeing the NASA Interim Directive to the policy in November and revision of NPR 7150.2.	
2012-03-05	**Five Year Roadmap for Continuous Improvement of the Agency's Mishap Investigation Process:** Link status reports of the five year mishap investigations process plan with progress reports on the NASA drug and alcohol policy development. Also, continue to report on the training of the MIT and the investigation Board Chairs in greater detail to include the method, consistency, and quality of training for MIT members and Board Chairs.	Open. Awaiting implementation of safety investigation training program.	
2012-04-01	**Alignment of NASA OSMA and OCE Budgets with Line Authority**: NASA should review and determine the appropriateness of having OSMA and OCE in a non-safety aligned budget line item and office.	Open. Request NASA briefing on the plan.	
2013-01-01	**Philosophy on the Certification Process:** NASA should develop a philosophical approach to the certification process; specifically, when NASA certification is required and when it is not.	Open. Action assigned (7/12/13): come back in 6 months on what constitutes "NASA personnel."	

Red highlights what the ASAP considers to be a long-standing concern or an issue that has not yet been adequately addressed by NASA.
Yellow highlights an important ASAP concern or issue, but one that is currently being addressed by NASA.
Green indicates a positive aspect or a concern that is being adequately addressed by NASA but continues to be followed by the Panel.